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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. : 
MARK CALDWELL, : Category No. 13 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole question presented for review is whether the 
court of appeals incorrectly dismissed the State's appeal as 
moot. 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' order of dismissal was issued on 
August 22, 1990 (a copy of the order is contained in Appendix A). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Mark Caldwell, was charged with arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, a second degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990). 
After the State had presented its evidence at trial, 
defendant moved to dismiss the charge against him. The court 
granted defendant's motion and entered a judgment of dismissal. 
Thereafter, the State filed a motion to set aside the judgment of 
dismissal, which the court denied. 
The State appealed the trial court's dismissal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, filing its brief on May 16, 1990 (a copy 
of the State's brief is contained in Appendix B). After 
defendant filed a document entitled "Notice of Non-Response of 
Appellee" (a copy of which is contained in Appendix C) on July 3, 
1990, the court of appeals issued an order dated July 13, 1990 (a 
copy of which is contained in Appendix D), which stated that the 
court had elected to treat defendant's "notice as a Suggestion of 
Mootness" and that the State was required to file a response 
thereto. After the State filed a response (a copy of which is 
contained in Appendix E), the court of appeals issued its order 
dismissing the State's appeal as moot. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A recitation of the facts of defendant's crime is not 
necessary for purposes of this petition. The relevant facts are 
those stated in the Statement of the Case, above, and the 
additional facts that follow. 
As noted to the court of appeals in the State's 
Response to Suggestion of Mootness (Appendix E), the State, in 
exchange for defendant's cooperation in the preparation of a 
partial statement of the case which would be filed in the 
appellate court in lieu of a transcript of the proceedings in the 
trial court, agreed not to pursue the matter against defendant 
any further jLE the State were to prevail on appeal. The parties 
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did not enter this agreement with the view that the State's 
appeal might be dismissed pursuant to a suggestion of mootness 
filed by defendant. The sole purpose of the agreement was to put 
before the court of appeals an important question of law 
supported by a trial court record which would be prepared at the 
least expense to the parties, 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED 
THE STATE'S APPEAL AS MOOT. 
The court of appeals erroneously dismissed the State's 
appeal as moot. "A case is deemed moot when the requested 
judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." 
Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989) (emphasis 
added). In its appeal to the court of appeals, the State 
requested that the trial court's dismissal of the charge against 
defendant be reversed. Because the State's requested relief 
would clearly affect the State's right to prosecute defendant, 
the issue concerning the propriety of the charge against 
defendant is not moot. The State's representation to defendant 
that it would not pursue further the matter against him was 
contingent upon the appeal going forward and the court of appeals 
ruling in its favor. That the State would, in its discretion, 
not pursue the case against defendant if it prevailed on appeal 
does not render the appellate issue moot. 
The only issue on appeal was whether the trial court 
erroneously dismissed the charge against defendant on the ground 
that a potential purchaser could not, as a matter of law, be 
guilty of arranging to distribute a controlled substance under 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990). 
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Furthermore, the court of appeals erred in not allowing 
the State relief from its agreement if that agreement technically 
rendered the appeal moot. In the court of appeals, the State 
argued: 
If this Court determines that the 
agreement between the parties somehow renders 
the appeal moot, the case should not be 
dismissed. Rather, the State should be 
allowed to request a transcript of the 
proceedings below to replace the partial 
statement of the case, which was stipulated 
to by defendant as part of the parties' 
agreement. The parties did not enter their 
agreement with the view that the appeal might 
be dismissed pursuant to a suggestion of 
mootness filed by defendant. Clearly, that 
was not the State's intention; nor could that 
reasonably have been defendant's 
understanding. The sole pupose of the 
agreement was to put before this Court an 
important question of law supported by a 
trial court record which would be prepared at 
the least expense to the parties. Indeed, 
the lack of any reference to rule 37(a), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, or of any 
request for dismissal of the State's appeal 
in defendant's notice of non-response 
indicates that defendant did not intend for 
the document to be treated as a suggestion of 
mootness. 
• • • • 
If the Court determines that the agreement 
between the parties has the effect of 
rendering the appeal moot, the State should 
be allowed to perfect the record on appeal 
outside the context of the agreement and 
pursue its appeal. By entering the agreement 
that they did, the parties simply did not 
intend to preclude the State from taking an 
appeal due to mootness. 
State's Response to Suggestion of Mootness at 2-3 (Appendix E). 
Based on these arguments, the court of appeals, as a matter of 
fairness, should have allowed the State to perfect its appeal 
outside the context of the agreement with defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State's petition 
for certiorari should be granted pursuant to rule 46(b) & (c), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in that the court of appeals 
has decided a question of law that is in conflict with decisions 
of this Court and, in rendering its decision to dismiss, has so 
far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings as to call for the exercise of this Court's power of 
supervision. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this c£/ day of September, 
1990 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to J. 
Franklin Allred, Attorney for Respondent, 321 South 600 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this °*/ day of September, 1990. 
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ORDER 
Case No. 900066-CA 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mark Caldwell, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Davidson (On Law and 
Motion). 
This matter is before the court on its own suggestion of 
mootness. Based on respondent's statement in lieu of brief, 
which was adopted by the court as a suggestion of mootness and 
on the response to the suggestion by the State of Utah as 
appellant, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the appeal is dismissed as moot 
due to the absence of a case or controversy between the parties 
to the appeal. 
DATED this JZJ^f: day of August, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT: 
___,—**i# S<r*—^ — 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of August, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail or personally delivered to each of the parties below. 
State Attorney Ueneral 
Assistant" Attorney TSenera 1 
236 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
B U I L D I N G M A I L 
J, Franklin Allred 
Attorney at Law 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102-4082 
DATED this 21st day of August, 1990, 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 900066-CA 
v. : 
MARK CALDWELL, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a dismissal of the charge of 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a second degree 
felony, under Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989) and rule 26(3)(a), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial 
court erroneously dismissed the charge against defendant on the 
ground that a potential purchaser could not, as a matter of law, 
be guilty of arranging to distribute a controlled substance under 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990). 
Because the trial court's ruling is strictly a legal 
conclusion, this Court affords it no deference on appeal and 
applies a "correction of error" standard. Provo City Corporation 
v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); State v. Wessendorf, 
777 P.2d 523, 526 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 781 P.2d 878 
(Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant text of statutory provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in the 
body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Mark Caldwell, was charged with arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, a second degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990) (R. 7). 
After the State had presented its evidence at trial, 
defendant moved to dismiss the charge against him. The court 
granted defendant's motion and entered a judgment of dismissal 
(R. 56-58; Partial Statement of the Case (hereafter "Statement") 
at 3). Thereafter, the State filed a motion to set aside the 
judgment of dismissal, which the court denied (R. 62-69, 146-48). 
The State now appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no dispute as to the facts. On April 20, 
1989, several undercover police officers were at a residence in 
1
 Pursuant to rule 11(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
the parties have prepared and submitted to the trial court a 
partial statement of the case for purposes of this appeal. That 
statement, which covers the undisputed facts developed at trial 
and the court's ruling from the bench, should be a part of the 
record on appeal at the time this case is submitted to the Court 
for decision. 
The trial court's ruling from the bench also appears in a 
transcript included as an appendix to the State's motion to set 
aside the judgment of dismissal (see R. 72-86). 
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Salt Lake County executing a search warrant. At approximately 
5:50 in the evening, defendant and a female arrived at the 
residence and knocked on the door. When one of the officers 
opened the door and asked what they wanted, defendant responded 
that he wanted "a half ounce," a request the officer, based on 
his experience with drug transactions, understood to be one for a 
half ounce of cocaine. It soon became apparent that defendant in 
fact desired to purchase cocaine (Statement at 1-2). 
The officer asked defendant if he had the money, and 
defendant gave him a check which appeared to be a tax refund 
check in the amount of $750 and some change. The officer told 
defendant that he could not use the check, to which defendant 
responded that he would go and cash it. When the officer asked 
defendant if he was sure of what he wanted, defendant said, 
"Yeah, a half ounce of cocaine." At that point the officer 
identified himself as a police officer, arrested defendant, and 
seized the check (Statement at 2). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the instant case, defendant attempted to purchase 
cocaine. Under State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983), and 
State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43 (Utah 1987), he, as a potential 
purchaser who engaged in the conduct that he did, can be 
criminally liable under the "arranging" provision contained in 
Utah Code Ann. $ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990). That provision, as 
construed in Ontiveros and Renfro, logically applies to both 
potential sellers and potential buyers. The trial court 
erroneously concluded otherwise. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT A 
POTENTIAL PURCHASER OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
CANNOT BE CRIMINALLY LIABLE UNDER THE 
"ARRANGING" PROVISION CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1990). 
The trial court dismissed the charge against defendant 
on the ground that "[n]one of the sections [of the pertinent Utah 
statutes] interdict and prohibit the purchase or attempted 
purchase of drugs if there is no accompanying possession of a 
drug by the purchaser or attempted purchaser." Statement at 3. 
This conclusion failed to take into account several key cases 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court, which were cited to the court 
by the State in its motion to set aside the judgment (R. 64-69). 
Defendant's attempted purchase of a controlled 
substance clearly violates the "arranging" provision of section 
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) , under which he was charged. That section 
provides in pertinent part that it is unlawful for a person to 
knowingly and intentionally "agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance." In State v. 
Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court, 
interpreting the "arranging" provision as it appeared under a 
prior codification (section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)), stated: 
[A]ny witting or intentional lending of aid 
in the distribution of drugs, whatever form 
it takes, is proscribed by the act, 
601 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added). That one who attempts to 
purchase a controlled substance can be guilty of arranging is 
supported by State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983) 
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(construing former section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)). There, the 
defendant, upon the request of an undercover officer to purchase 
some marijuana, accompanied the officer to a residence where 
defendant took the officer's $40, went into the residence, 
returned shortly thereafter, and delivered a bag of marijuana to 
the officer. In reversing the defendant's conviction of 
distributing a controlled substance for value and concluding that 
this was instead "a classic case of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance for value,'1 the Court observed that " [t]he 
evidence only shows that the [defendant] acted as the officer's 
agent in making the purchase from a third party,•• 674 P.2d at 
104 (emphasis in original). Obviously, if a purchaser's agent 
can be guilty of arranging under these circumstances, the 
purchaser (the principal) also can be guilty of arranging. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990). 
To convict one (including a purchaser) of arranging, 
the state need not prove a completed transaction. As stated in 
Harrison: 
Inasmuch as an actual sale took place in this 
case, it is unnecessary to address the point, 
but it is noteworthy that the offense of 
arranging the distribution for value of a 
controlled substance does not require the 
actual distribution. All that is needed is 
the arrangement for such distribution, 
coupled with knowledge or intent. Evidence 
of an actual sale may be helpful, or even 
necessary, in proving knowledge or intent, 
but sale itself is not an element of the 
offense. 
601 P.2d at 924 n.5. And, the conduct engaged in by defendant in 
the instant case plainly constitutes the crime of arranging. In 
State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 1987), the Court held that 
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the defendant, a seller, could be found guilty of arranging where 
he "discussed the purchase [of marijuana] with officers, set a 
price for the marijuana, and agreed to make the exchange." 
Defendant's conduct was nearly identical, the only difference 
being that he was on the other end of the transaction. 
When read together, Ontiveros and Renfro support the 
conclusion that a potential purchaser, who engages in conduct 
like that engaged in by defendant, is guilty of arranging under 
section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). The trial court's view that that 
section is directed at sellers only, see Statement at 2-3, 
ignores Ontiveros, where the defendant was specifically 
identified as the purchaser's agent. Indeed, there is no logical 
reason to distinguish sellers from buyers for purposes of the 
crime of arranging; the distribution of a controlled substance 
may be as much arranged by the buyer as by the seller. It is 
difficult to argue that the middleman in a "classic case of 
arranging" who merely brings the buyer and seller together, as 
was the case in Ontiveros and Harrison, is more culpable than the 
potential purchaser who arranges the transaction himself or 
herself. 
In sum, the trial court failed to consider adequately 
the facts and holdings of Ontiveros and Renfro in dismissing the 
charge against defendant. Those cases support an arranging 
charge, even though defendant was a potential purchaser. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's judgment of dismissal. 
•6-
/ p ^ ^ d a ^ RESPECTFULLY submitted t h i s J&U day of May, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON // 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
J. Franklin Allred, Attorney for Appellee, 321 South 600 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this /(£%day of May, 1990. 
AT^UHJL I/O ^ j ^ L 
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APPENDIX C 
J. FRANKILN ALLRED, P.C. #A0058 
Attorney for Appellee 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 531-1900 
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OFFICE OS-
ATTORNEY GENEFV II 
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH/ 
Plaintiff-Appellant/ ' 
v s . ) 
MARK CALDWELL/ 
Defendant-Appellee. ' 
1 NOTICE OF NON-RESPONSE OF 
1 APPELLEE 
i Case No. 900066-CA 
Category No. 2 
The Appellee above-named by and through his Attorney J. 
'Franklin Allred/ hereby gives Notice to the Appellant that there 
was no response to the Brief on the grounds and for the reasons 
that a prior agreement between Appellee and Appellant makes the 
issues raised by the Appellant moot as to the Appellee and the 
Appellee elects not to extend the time and the expense to file a 
Responsive Brief. Ji 
DATED th i. ? day of July/ 199Q 
^T. FRANKLIN ALLRED / 
Attorney for Appellee 
e c u ? §*rrrv O. w' 
rv /' 
f ' r ' • » / • 130H 
• ^ v . . « • • , * , y 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEi»T^j /g]3kTri; /;'** f 
ooOoo 
S t a t e of Utah, 
P l a i n t i f f and Appe l l an t , 
v . 
Mark Ca ldwel l , 
Defendant and Appe l l ee . 
JUL 1 6 . ^ 
ORDER OFFICE Or 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Case No/^OoOfi^CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench and Davidson (On Law and Motion). 
This matter is before the court on its own motion pursuant 
to Utah R. App. P. 37(a). 
In lieu of a brief, appellee filed a Notice of 
Non-Response of Appellee in which he represents "that a prior 
agreement between Appellee and Appellant makes the issues 
raised by the Appellant moot as to the Appellee." We elect to 
treat this notice as a Suggestion of Mootness. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant, the State of Utah, 
shall file a response to the suggestion of mootness within ten 
days of the date of this order, addressing why this appeal 
should not be dismissed because it does not involve an actual 
case or controversy between the parties. 
DATED this ,; ?*/i day of July, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT: 
S 
jPamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice Of Non-Response of Appellee was mailed postage 
prepaid to David B. Thompson/ Assistant Attorney General/ 236 
State Captiol/ Salt Lake City/ Utah 84114. 
DATED this ? d a y of July, 1990. 
APPENDIX D 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of July, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail and/or hand delivered. 
R. Paul Van Dam 
State Attorney General 
David B. Thompson 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
B U I L D I N G M A I L 
J. Franklin Allred 
Attorney at Law 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102-4082 
DATED this 16th day of July, 1990. 
Byv^ lk\\ Jjtid$i\ 
Deputy/fclerk 
APPENDIX E 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : RESPONSE TO SUGGESTION OF 
MOOTNESS 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : 
v. : 
MARK CALDWELL, : Case No. 900066-CA 
Defendant-Appellee. : 
This response to defendant's Notice of Non-Response of 
Appellee, which the Court has chosen to treat as a suggestion of 
mootness, is filed pursuant to the Court's order of July 15, 
1990. 
Defendant indicates in his notice that he waives the 
filing of a responsive brief because "a prior agreement between 
[him] and [the State] makes the issues raised by the [State] moot 
as to [him] . . ..M That representation is based on an agreement 
reached between the parties that if the State prevails on appeal, 
it will not pursue the matter against defendant any further (see 
Exhibit A, attached hereto, which is a letter memorializing that 
agreement). This concession by the State was made in exchange 
for defendant's cooperation in the preparation of a partial 
statement of the case in lieu of a transcript of the proceedings 
below. 
"A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial 
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." Burkett v. 
Schwendimanf 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989). In its appeal the 
State has requested that the trial court's dismissal of the 
charge against defendant be reversed. Because the State's 
requested relief would clearly affect its right to prosecute 
defendant, the issue concerning the propriety of the charge 
against defendant is not moot. The State's representation to 
defendant that it will not pursue the matter further against him 
is contingent upon the appeal going forward and this Court ruling 
in its favor. That the State will, in its discretion, not pursue 
the case against defendant if it prevails on appeal does not 
render the appellate issue moot. 
If this Court determines that the agreement between the 
parties somehow renders the appeal moot, the case should not be 
dismissed. Rather, the State should be allowed to request a 
transcript of the proceedings below to replace the partial 
statement of the case, which was stipulated to by defendant as 
part of the parties' agreement. The parties did not enter their 
agreement with the view that the appeal might be dismissed 
pursuant to a suggestion of mootness filed by defendant. 
Clearly, that was not the State's intention; nor could that 
reasonably have been defendant's understanding. The sole purpose 
of the agreement was to put before this Court an important 
question of law supported by a trial court record which would be 
prepared at the least expense to the parties. Indeed, the lack 
of any reference to rule 37(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
•2-
Procedure, or of any request for dismissal of the State's appeal 
in defendant's notice of non-response indicates that defendant 
did not intend for the document to be treated as a suggestion of 
mootness. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should not consider 
the issue raised in the State's appeal to be moot. 
If the Court determines that the agreement between the 
parties has the effect of rendering the appeal moot, the State 
should be allowed to perfect the record on appeal outside the 
context of the agreement and pursue its appeal. By entering the 
agreement that they did, the parties simply did not intend to 
preclude the State from taking an appeal due to mootness. 
DATED this *?3 ^ *<3ay of July, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON V 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Response to Suggestion of Mootness was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to J. Franklin Allred, Attorney for Appellee, 321 South 
600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this g£3"ciay of July, 
1990. 
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OFFICE OF 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - An<*M> GIMKXI 
i.V.STATFC:ArnOL • SALT LAk> C m . UTAH Ml 14 • TELErHON*. ftOl-SM-IOIS • FAX NO 801 *n JJ2J 
JOSEPH E TESCH 
CHIEF DfPUlY ATTORNEY CIMRM 
STATE OF UTAH 
May 1 6 , 1990 
J. Franklin Allred, Esq. 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v. Caldwell, Case No. 900066-CA 
Dear John: 
In accordance with our telephone conversation earlier 
today, this letter is to inform you that if the State, as 
appellant, prevails in the above-referenced appeal, neither the 
Utah Attorney General nor the Salt Lake County Attorney will 
pursue the matter against Mr. Caldwell any further. Roger 
Blaylock, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, has authorized me to 
make this representation on behalf of the Salt Lake County 
Attorney. In exchange, you have agreed to stipulate to the 
partial statement of the case I have prepared for purposes of 
this appeal. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Governmental Affairs Div. 
DBT/pa 
cci Roger Blaylock 
